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The African State and Special Procedures: Agency, Leverage and Legitimacy 
 
Jonathan Fisher and Danielle Beswick
1
 
 
This chapter focuses on the broader international politics of the Special Procedures 
(SP) systems, examining – at both theoretical and empirical levels – why and how 
states engage with the system and to what end. In doing so, African states’ relations 
with UN SP (Special Rapporteurs (SR) and Working Groups) and African Union 
(AU) SR will be explored in depth, reflecting both Africa’s prominence on lists of 
visit requests developed annually by UN SP and its frequent characterisation as a 
continent of ‘weak’ polities by analysts and commentators. 
 
Our analysis seeks to unpack and challenge this latter notion by considering the nature 
and calibration of African agency in the international system, both at a general level 
and when viewed through the lens of SP, a perspective rarely adopted to date in legal 
and social science explorations of African states’ place in the international system. To 
do so, we draw upon data collated from annual UN SR and Working Group reports to 
the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and AU SR reports to the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) mapping SR and Working 
Group visit requests and visits undertaken to African states since the early 2000s. 
 
In doing so, we focus primarily on the seven UN thematic mandates of human rights 
defenders, freedom of expression, violence against women, migrants and internally 
displaced, arbitrary detention and discrimination against women which are mirrored 
in the AU SP system. In doing so, we recognise that this captures only a part of the 
UN and AU SP systems.
2
 Our interest here, however, is in exploring the interaction 
between the two systems and how African states engage herein – and with what 
implications. It is therefore appropriate to focus particularly on where the two systems 
directly correspond, and this is the approach taken in this chapter. This comparative 
data is complemented by data collected in interviews conducted with state and 
                                                        
1
 The authors are extremely grateful to Anna Jobe (PhD candidate, University of Durham) and Louis 
Monroy Santander (PhD candidate, University of Birmingham) for their invaluable contribution to this 
project as research assistants. We are also grateful to Richard Moncrieff, Paul Bentall and other 
colleagues in the Africa and Multilateral Research Groups at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office for their insights and advice on the general themes of this project and its context. The authors 
are grateful to the University of Birmingham’s College of Social Sciences-College of Arts and Law 
Sandpit Scheme for funding this research. 
2
 There are currently 34 additional thematic UN SP and 14 country mandate UN SP (6 African) which 
we do not expressly cover, a full list of UN SP thematic and country mandates are available at UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Thematic Mandates’ (2015) 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=
TM accessed 1 November 2015 and ‘Country Mandates’ (2015) 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx 
accessed 1 November 2015. We do, nevertheless, explore the 6 Africa mandates in a number of 
instances. There are also currently an additional eight additional thematic AU SP which we do not 
expressly cover, a full list of AU mandates are available at ACHPR, ‘Special Mechanisms’ (2015) 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx 
accessed 1 November 2015. While the seven UN SP mandates explore here are mirrored directly in the 
AU mandates for human rights defenders and freedom of expression there are slight differences in 
framing under other themes: prisons and detention (AU) instead of arbitrary detention (UN); rights of 
women (AU) instead of violence against, and discrimination against, women (UN) and refugees (AU) 
instead of migrants (UN) and internally displaced (UN).  
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international actors across eastern Africa by both authors since 2006
3
 along with 
discussions with key respondents in the UN human rights architecture undertaken in 
Geneva in May 2015. Secondary data derived from media houses, public statements 
and other sources is also engaged with. 
 
We argue that while African states exhibit ‘weakness’ in a range of areas, many can 
and do exercise considerable strength and agency in the international system – 
sometimes through instrumentalising these very weaknesses and sometimes through 
strategically engaging or disengaging with parts of the system. We see both forms of 
behaviour evident among a range of semi-authoritarian African states, whose 
governments use the UN SP system, in part, to improve their standing within the 
international community and UN architecture as well as to ‘socialise’ some internal 
crises (eg internally-displaced persons) and secure international resources to deal with 
them. 
 
We emphasise, however, the complexity of the picture: many African states engage 
with the SR systems in good faith, often making an important contribution to its work 
and outputs. While lack of resources (for UN and AU SP, as well as for African states 
themselves) limit the effectiveness of the system, of more fundamental significance 
for its overall future efficacy are the issues of credibility and legitimacy. The 
somewhat adversarial nature of the UN SP system sits uncomfortably in an African 
context where defence of state sovereignty above all else often remains the central 
fulcrum of international relations.
4
 The AU SP system is therefore far more 
deferential and dialogue-based than that of the UN and while greater cooperation 
between both sets of actors will allow the fostering of greater independence and voice 
among the former, the latter also have much to learn for their own practice through 
such an interaction, as this chapter will discuss. 
 
In terms of structure, the chapter will first challenge the notion of African state 
‘weakness’ at the international level before exploring how a range of African 
governments have secured agency through strategically engaging with the UN and 
AU SR systems. Part two will nevertheless caution against an interpretation of 
African engagement with the systems based wholly in realpolitik, emphasising more 
                                                        
3
 Primarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. This interview data acts primarily as a 
complement to the visit request data – the latter being the primary evidence explored in the chapter. 
Eastern Africa nonetheless represents one of the most significant regions of UN SP and AU SR activity 
in Africa and includes four of the six states currently the focus of UN SR country mandates (Burundi, 
Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan). Ethiopia is also the home of the African Union and thus accessing 
diplomats from across the continent has been possible. The interview data therefore provides more than 
simply a regional perspective on the interactions between the UN SP/AU SR systems and African 
states.  
4
 The artificial creation – and questionable domestic legitimacy - of many African states through the 
colonial/postcolonial experience, coupled with many African governments’ inability or unwillingness 
to extend state control and infrastructure beyond urban areas has led many scholars to highlight the 
defence and instrumentalisation of state sovereignty as a central survival strategy for many postcolonial 
African polities. See, for example. Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of 
extraversion’ [2000] African Affairs  99 (395), 217-267; William Brown, ‘Sovereignty matters: Africa, 
donors and the aid relationship’ [2013] African Affairs 112 (447), 262-282;  Christopher Clapham, 
Africa in the international system: The politics of state survival (CUP 1996); Jeff Herbst, States and 
Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control (Princeton University Press 2000); 
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, ‘Why Africa’s weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in 
statehood’ [1982] World Politics 35 (1), 1-24. 
 3 
constructive forms of interaction as well as highlighting the under-estimation of 
norms of sovereignty and legitimacy by the UN system in its engagement with Africa. 
The piece concludes by examining the implications of these findings for practitioners 
in both systems. 
 
1. African agency and Special Procedures 
 
1.1 The ‘African agency’ literature 
 
The characterisation of African states as ‘weak’ in the international system is a 
longstanding trope in Western political science as well as in Western and international 
policy-making circles.
5
 With sometimes more than half of their national budgets 
funded by North American and European governments
6
, African states are often 
either ignored in International Relations theory-building altogether or dismissed as 
passive or dependent objects of a set of power dynamics and norm creations which 
they play little to no active role in influencing.
7
 Often barely able to project their 
authority beyond their capital cities, let alone beyond their borders, African states 
have also been the main recipients of the ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state label developed by 
World Bank, OECD and academic analysts since the 1990s.
8
 Where African agency 
has been recognised in these various arenas it has tended to be critiqued in sometimes 
quite pejorative and paternalistic terms; African states not conforming to international 
standards on governance or human rights, or African states lagging behind the rest of 
the community of nations vis-à-vis economic liberalisation or adopting international 
legal norms.
9
 
                                                        
5  William Brown, ‘Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and 
Statehood’ [2006] Review of International Studies 32 (1) 119-143; William Brown, ‘Sovereignty 
matters: Africa, donors and the aid relationship’ [2013] African Affairs 112 (447), 262-282; Sophie 
Harman and William Brown, ‘In from the margins? The changing place of Africa in International 
Relations’ [2013] International Affairs 89 (1) 69-87; Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw (eds) Africa’s 
Challenge to International Relations Theory (Palgrave Macmillan 2001). 
6
 Isaline Bergamaschi, ‘The fall of a donor darling: The role of aid in Mali’s crisis’ [2014], Journal of 
Modern African Studies 52 (3), 358; Jonathan Fisher and David M Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and 
the securitization of development in Africa’ [2015] International Affairs 91 (1) 131-151; Haley 
Swedlund, ‘From donorship to ownership: Budget support and donor influence in Rwanda and 
Tanzania’ [2013], Public Administration and Development 33, 361-363. 
7  William Brown, ‘Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and 
Statehood’ [2006] Review of International Studies 32 (1) 119-143; William Brown, ‘Sovereignty 
matters: Africa, donors and the aid relationship’ [2013] African Affairs 112 (447), 262-282; Sophie 
Harman and William Brown, ‘In from the margins? The changing place of Africa in International 
Relations’ [2013] International Affairs 89 (1) 69-87; Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw (eds) Africa’s 
Challenge to International Relations Theory (Palgrave Macmillan 2001). 
8
 Valerie Arnould, ‘Transitional justice and democracy in Uganda: Between impetus and 
instrumentalisation’ [2015] Journal of Eastern African Studies 9 (3) 354-374; Jonathan Fisher, ‘When 
it pays to be a “fragile state”: Uganda’s use and abuse of a dubious concept’ [2014] Third World 
Quarterly 35 (2) 316-322; Sonja Grimm, Nicolas Lemay-Hebert and Olivier Nay, “Fragile States”: 
Introducing a political concept’ [2014] Third World Quarterly 25 (2) 197-209; Nicolas Lemay-Hebert 
and Xavier Mathieu ‘The OECD’s discourse on fragile states: Experts and the normalization of 
knowledge production’ [2014] Third World Quarterly 35 (2) 232-251. 
9 Examples of this from a range of literatures and media include, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, ‘Why has 
Africa fallen behind the rest of the world’s economies’, Guardian (London, 4 August 2014); Robert 
Rotberg, ‘The failure and collapse of nation-states: Breakdown, prevention and repair’, in Robert 
Rotberg (ed), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton University Press 2003); Frans 
Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (OUP 2012) 142. 
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In recent years, however, scholars have sought to challenge this narrative through 
unpacking the spaces and opportunities for – as well as the limitations of – African 
agency in the global system.
10
 Though the concept of ‘agency’ is understood in 
multiple ways across political science – as well as philosophy and sociology – we 
conceive of it in a broad sense as a state’s ability to as it intends to within the 
international system.
11
 
 
Focusing on a range of different issues – including on collective bargaining by 
African states within the World Trade Organization, block-voting in the UN General 
Assembly and individual states’ interactions with particular agendas (eg peacekeeping 
and conflict resolution) – the African agency literature has revealed the degree to 
which African states can, and have, carved-out significant agency in the international 
system in a number of contexts, often by instrumentalising their perceived 
weakness.
12
 
By playing-on notions of fragility and memories of a violent and unstable past, for 
example, African governments encourage their counterparts elsewhere in the world to 
‘set the bar low’ when assessing their achievements and transgressions, particularly in 
the sphere of democratisation.
13
 This approach also enables African states to 
successfully solicit international aid flows (financial and military), rendering the 
complex and politically risky task of raising domestic revenue less necessary. This 
‘extraversion’, as it has been characterised by Jean-Francois Bayart, has become a 
                                                        
10
 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad, ‘African agency in a changing security environment: 
Sources, opportunities and challenges’ [2013] Conflict, Security and Development 13 (5) 471-486; 
William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in International Politics (Routledge 2013); 
Lindsay Whitfield (ed), The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors (OUP 2008). 
11
 See William Brown, ‘A question of agency: Africa in international politics’ [2012] Third World 
Quarterly 10 (33) 1893-1899 for a more detailed discussion of this. 
12
 Danielle Beswick, ‘From weak state to savvy international player? Rwanda’s multi-level strategy for 
maximising agency’, in William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in International 
Politics (Routledge 2013); Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad, ‘African agency in a changing 
security environment: Sources, opportunities and challenges’ [2013] Conflict, Security and 
Development 13 (5) 471-486; William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in 
International Politics (Routledge 2013); Devon Curtis, ‘Development assistance and the lasting 
legacies of rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda’ [2015] Third World Quarterly 36 (7) 1365-1381; 
Jonathan Fisher, ‘Structure, agency and Africa in the international system: Donor diplomacy and 
regional security policy in East Africa since the 1990s’ [2013] Conflict, Security and Development 13 
(5) 537-567; Jonathan Fisher, ‘When it pays to be a “fragile state”: Uganda’s use and abuse of a 
dubious concept’ [2014] Third World Quarterly 35 (2) 316-322; Valerie Freeland, ‘Rebranding the 
state: Uganda’s strategic use of the International Criminal Court’ [2015] Development and Change 46 
(2) 293-319; Donna Lee, ‘African agency in global trade governance’, in William Brown and Sophie 
Harman (eds), African Agency in International Politics (Routledge 2013); Thomas Tieku, ‘Exercising 
African agency in Burundi via multilateral channels: Opportunities and challenges’ [2013] Conflict, 
Security and Development 13 (5) 513-535; Lindsay Whitfield (ed), The Politics of Aid: African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors (OUP 2008); Siphamandla Zondi, ‘Common positions as African 
agency in international negotiations: An appraisal’, in William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), 
African Agency in International Politics (Routledge 2013). 
13
 See, for example, Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s comments in the lead-up to the 
country’s May 2015 elections, Al-Jazeera, ‘Hailemariam Desalegn: Democracy ‘not only an election’, 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2015/05/hailemariam-desalegn-democracy-
election-150522074045193.html> last accessed 1 November 2015; see also Stephen Brown, “Well, 
what can you expect?” Donor officials’ apologetics for hybrid regimes in Africa [2011] 
Democratization 18 (2) 512-534. 
 5 
particularly rewarding strategy for African states given the post-2001 preoccupation 
of Western governments – along with that of the UN and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) - with supporting stable and resilient African states in the context of 
a ‘Global War on Terror’.14  
The manner in which such behaviour allows African states to advance more ‘positive’ 
activities into the limelight and, thereby, cast more controversial ones into the 
shadows has been linked by Beswick to Steven David’s theory of ‘omni-balancing’ – 
an analysis of how leaders in the Third World change alignments in global politics on 
the basis of rational cost-benefit analyses of their best interests vis-à-vis the overall 
context of domestic and international political forces.
15
 Though rejecting various 
aspects of the concept when applied to the current, post-Cold War developing world, 
she nevertheless highlights the core framework of the theory – which focuses on how 
leaders ‘balance’ internal and external threats to their hold on power to survive – as 
valuable for understanding African engagement with the international system. 
Analysing the case of Rwanda, she demonstrates how the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF)-led government aligned with international actors over regional conflict 
resolution in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during 2009-2010 to 
head-off criticism and aid suspensions from the same actors (and their possible 
alignment with domestic Rwandan opposition groups) over democratic backsliding in 
the lead-up to elections in that country in August 2010.
16
 
Similar interpretations have been applied to the behaviour of governments in Ghana 
and Uganda during the 1990s and those of Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad during the 
2000s.
17
 Haynes (2001) and others have argued that semi-authoritarian regimes in 
Ghana and Uganda strategically aligned with powerful Western institutions such as 
the World Bank in the field of economic liberalisation in order to neutralise criticism 
(and potential aid cuts) from elsewhere in the donor community regarding limited 
democratisation.
18
  
                                                        
14
 Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’ [2000] African Affairs 99 
(395), 217-267; Jan Bachmann, ‘Governmentality and counterterrorism: Appropriating international 
security projects in Kenya’ [2012] Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6 (1) 41-56; Jonathan 
Fisher and David M Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitisation of development in Africa’, 
International Affairs 91 (1) 131-151; Cedric Jourde, ‘Constructing representations of the “Global War 
on Terror” in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ [2007] Journal of Contemporary African Studies  25 
(1) 77-100. 
15 Danielle Beswick, ‘From weak state to savvy international player? Rwanda’s multi-level strategy for 
maximising agency’, in William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in International 
Politics (Routledge 2013); Steven David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third 
World (Johns Hopkins University Press 1991). 
16 Danielle Beswick, ‘From weak state to savvy international player? Rwanda’s multi-level strategy for 
maximising agency’, in William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African Agency in International 
Politics (Routledge 2013). 
17
 Jonathan Fisher and David M Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitisation of development in 
Africa’, International Affairs 91 (1) 131-151; Jeff Haynes, ‘Limited Democracy in Ghana and Uganda: 
What is most important to international actors: Stability or Political Freedom?’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies [2001] 19 (2) 183-204. 
18
 Jeff Haynes, ‘Limited Democracy in Ghana and Uganda: What is most important to international 
actors: Stability or Political Freedom?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies [2001] 19 (2) 183-
204; Andrew Mwenda and Roger Tangri, ‘Patronage politics, donor reforms and regime consolidation 
in Uganda’ [2005], African Affairs 104 (416) 449-467. 
 6 
More recently, similar patterns have been identified by Fisher, Anderson and others in 
analysing strategic alignments by a range of African polities with security-focused 
Western actors (eg the White House National Security Council, Pentagon, UK 
Ministry of Defence, Elysee Palace, UN DPKO) regarding counter-terrorism or 
peacekeeping policies since 2001, playing them off against other institutions within 
their bureaucracies whose focus is more on democratisation and human rights (eg the 
State Department, US Congress,  UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office or 
UNHCR).
19
 There is also growing evidence of African states aligning with non-
Western (re-) ‘emerging donors’ such as China to similar ends.20 
This literature also underlines the degree to which these strategic alignments also 
serve to engender mutual dependency between international and African actors – in 
other words, this is not simply a case of African states ‘surviving’ within the system 
but also influencing and modifying it. As Harrison and others have argued, for 
example, the World Bank and other major donors require ‘success stories’ to validate 
their own prescriptions – and thus their international credibility as effective 
development institutions and thought-leaders. This provides significant room for 
manoeuvre among states such as 1990s-2000s Tanzania, Mozambique or Uganda 
which have implemented their policies and subsequently achieved economic 
growth.
21
 The Bank and others – according to this argument – have invested so much 
economic and political capital in these states that their fortunes are tied to them to 
some degree. Prevented from criticising these states’ shortcomings in the arenas of 
transparency, accountability or civil freedoms for fear of undermining their own 
reputation, therefore, these donors are compelled to modify their universalist 
discourses to justify the existence of ‘successful’ states which do not, however, 
conform to Western political sensitivities; what Harrison calls the ‘construction of 
“governance states”.  
The generation of these symbiotic relationships by seemingly ‘weak’ African states is 
perhaps most clearly captured, at present, in the sphere of international peace and 
security. The mid-1990s saw the UN and Western states heavily discredited in 
relation to African conflict, following several failed interventions in war-torn Somalia 
and the failure to intervene in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Responding to 
conflicting international and domestic pressures, these states and institutions rapidly 
came to throw their support behind regionally-led peacekeeping interventions as a 
solution, sometimes captured in the Clinton administration’s notion of ‘African 
solution to African problems’.22 Many African states came to support this agenda, 
                                                        
19
 Jonathan Fisher, ‘Image management in East Africa: Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and their donors’, in 
Julia Gallagher (ed) Images of Africa: Creation, Negotiation and Subversion (Manchester University 
Press, 2015); Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, The Politics of Elite Corruption in Africa: Uganda 
in Comparative African Perspective (Routledge, 2013) 149-160. 
20
 Padraig Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa (Polity Press, 2011); Sam Hickey, ‘Beyond the 
poverty agenda? Insights from the new politics of development in Uganda’ [2013] World Development 
43 194-206. 
21
 Graham Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa’ [2005], 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7 (2) 240-260; Ellen Hauser, ‘Ugandan relations 
with Western donors in the 1990s: What influence on democratisation’ [1999], Journal of Modern 
African Studies 37 (4) 621-641. 
22
 Mark Bradbury, ‘Normalising the crisis in Africa’ [1998] Disasters 22 (4) 328-338; Peter 
Rosenblum, ‘Irrational exuberance: The Clinton Administration in Africa’ [2002] Current History 101 
(655) 195-202. 
 7 
partly because of a genuine belief in the need for ‘local’ solutions to the continent’s 
security problems and partly to secure more comprehensive military assistance and 
training from Western states through their support for regional initiatives.
23
 
 
This led, during the 2000s, to a transformation of peacekeeping on the African 
continent whereby African states have become major contributors to UN forces 
(Ethiopia and Rwanda are among the top five global troop contributors to UN 
missions, Ghana and Nigeria are among the top ten)
24
 and regionally-led missions 
(under the AU or a sub-regional unit) have increased in number and scope 
substantially.
25
 For the UN and Western states, therefore, African states are now the 
key ‘intermediaries’ in the management of peace and conflict on the continent. This 
has been instrumentalised by a range of states through strategic alignments, as 
outlined above.
26
 It has also, however, been used directly as a quid pro quo by states 
such as Uganda and Rwanda, which have threatened to withdraw their troops from 
various missions central to UN and Western concerns in Africa (Somalia and Darfur 
respectively) unless policy shifts are made by these actors. In 2012, for example, the 
Ugandan government threatened to pull its troops out of the AU Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) unless allegations of Ugandan support for rebels in eastern DRC made by 
a UN Group of Experts be ‘withdrawn’. Western donors rapidly distanced themselves 
from the Group’s report (at least as concerned Uganda).27 
 
Crucially, however, African state agency is identified not only in the re-direction or 
neutralisation of pressures or criticisms from the outside world but also in the 
moulding and re-conceptualisation of key norms themselves. Fisher and Anderson 
(2015), for example, have demonstrated how the governments of Uganda, Ethiopia 
and Chad have employed savvy diplomacy to persuade governments in Europe and 
North America to re-frame how they view security threats emanating from parts of the 
African continent.
28
 Beswick, Holmes and others have explored the ways in which the 
Rwandan government has re-conceptualised the ‘peacekeeper’ not only as an external 
conflict management entity but as a service provider and organic part of post-conflict 
societies
29
, a narrative which has also emerged in Ethiopia in recent years
30
. 
                                                        
23
 Danielle Beswick, ‘Peacekeeping, regime security and “African solutions to African problems” 
[2010] Third World Quarterly 31 (5) 739-754; Paul Williams, ‘Keeping the peace in Africa: Why 
“African” solutions are not enough’ [2008] Ethics and International Affairs 22 (3) 309-329. 
24
 United Nations, ‘Troop and police contributors: Contributions by country’ (2015) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> last accessed 1 November 
2015. 
25
 Alex Vines, ‘A decade of African peace and security architecture’ [2013] International Affairs 89 (1) 
89-109. 
26 Danielle Beswick, ‘Peacekeeping, regime security and “African solutions to African problems” 
[2010] Third World Quarterly 31 (5) 739-754 and ‘The risks of African military [2014] -building: 
Lessons from Rwanda’, African Affairs 113 (451) 212-231; Alex de Waal, ‘Peacekeeping in the 
African political marketplace’ [2009] International Affairs 85 (1) 99-113; Nina Wilen, David 
Ambrosetti and Gerard Birantamije, ‘Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home: Burundi in 
Somalia’ [2015] Journal of Eastern African Studies 9 (2) 307-325. 
27 Jonathan Fisher and David M Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in 
Africa’ [2015] International Affairs 91 (1) 131-151. 
28 Ibid. 
29
 Danielle Beswick, ‘Military forces in contemporary development’, in Paul Jackson (ed) Handbook of 
International Security and Development (Edward Elgar, 2015); Georgina Holmes, ‘Gendering the 
Rwandan Defence Force: A Critical Assessment’ [2014], Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8 
(4) 321-333. See also Marco Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialisation: Liberation, tradition and 
 8 
 
This ‘African agency’ literature, therefore, cautions against a simplistic understanding 
of African states’ relationships with, and degree of influence within, the international 
system. For while there are clear limits to the ‘hard power’ most African states can 
seek to exercise, this does not preclude the securing of influence and agency through 
other means, particularly through the playing-off of different players against one 
another, strategic alignment with key actors or agendas and re-framing of ‘accepted’ 
norms through individual or collective action. 
 
1.2 African agency and the SP system 
 
The above discussion provides valuable context for understanding and exploring how 
African states engage with the SP system. For many African states, the UN (along, 
perhaps, with the World Bank and the US – or France31) is an international actor 
whose influence and significance cannot be ignored. Through its various agencies, the 
UN provides crucial support in the form of programme and project funding, 
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping support and resources to help manage refugee 
and IDP crises. The UN’s role as a normative actor – as the legitimiser of cross-
border interventions (via the UN Security Council) or as a global monitor of human 
rights (via the UNHRC) – is also of great significance for African states, not least 
because of the impact of its judgments and perspectives on the behaviour of global 
powers.
32
 It would be surprising, then, to not encounter attempts by African states to 
engage with the SP machinery as a means to further their own interests, whether these 
be in line with the machinery’s own goals or otherwise. 
 
The structure of the SP system also provides considerable room for manoeuvre and 
the carving-out of agency by African states. The existence of 41 thematic mandates 
and six African country mandates (see above) means that African states have the 
ability to engage selectively with SR – potentially those whose perspectives or 
mandates they sympathise with. The existence of a parallel AU SP machinery 
(appointed via the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ACHPR) – 
involving fourteen mandates at present - further expands this space. Finally, SR are 
not paid a fee for their work and thus rely on the UN/AU for research and 
administrative assistance with sending – and chasing-up - visit invitations, writing 
reports and other responsibilities.
33
 The UN SP branch has only limited resources to 
                                                                                                                                                              
modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force’ [2014], Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 
(2) 278-293; Josefine Kuehnel Larsen, ‘Peace by peace: The construction of national-military identity 
in post-genocide Rwanda’, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Copenhagen, 2014). 
30
 Interviews with senior Ethiopian political strategist and senior Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa, 
April 2015. 
31
 Guy Martin, ‘Continuity and change in Franc-African relations’ [1995] Journal of Modern African 
Studies 33 (1) 1-20; Richard Moncrieff, ‘French relations with sub-Saharan Africa under President 
Sarkozy’ [2012] SAIIA Occasional Paper 107. 
32
 There is a vast literature on the UN’s role as a normative actor, key texts for this context include 
Alex Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten’ [2015] Ethics and International Affairs 29 (2) 
161-185; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in 
Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004); Martha Finnemore, ‘International organizations as 
teachers of norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and science 
policy’ [1993] International Organization 47 (4) 565-597. 
33 Further information on appointment processes in both systems can be found below and at UN 
OHCHR, ‘Nomination, selection and appointment of mandate holders’ (2015) 
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support these activities while its AU equivalent has virtually none.
34
 SR must, 
therefore, be selective themselves in the countries and issues which they focus upon 
and must rely far more on the goodwill and cooperation of the countries in question to 
be effective than many other parts of the UN and AU machinery. Indeed, many AU 
SR are employed by African governments themselves (UN SR are more often 
employed by universities or independent policy institutes).
35
 
 
When reviewing the patterns of engagement by African states with SR from both 
systems it becomes clear that some states have simply sought to ignore them entirely. 
Eritrea, for example, has consistently ignored visit requests from both thematic SR 
(UN for Freedom of Expression) and the UN Eritrea SR, the latter being forced to rely 
instead on interviews with external experts and diaspora members in Europe and 
North Africa in putting together recent reports.
36
 This reflects the Asmara regime’s 
broader disengagement from much of the international system since the early 2000s. 
Ethiopia has been similarly disinterested in engaging the UN system although – like 
many African states - has welcomed its actions when they align with its own interests. 
The appointment of a UN SR for Eritrea in 2012 – Ethiopia’s key opponent in the 
region since war between the two states broke out in 1998 – was strongly supported 
by officials in Addis Ababa.
37
 
 
Others have – usually unsuccessfully - sought to use the system to strengthen their 
position in domestic power-plays. In 2009, for example, Zimbabwean Prime Minister 
Morgan Tsvangirai invited the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, to visit the country. 
Prior to this, Zimbabwe was a ‘serial invite ignorer’. Upon arrival, however, Nowak 
was detained by security personnel and put on a plane to South Africa the following 
morning. Later, Nowak stated that ‘I have not been treated by any government in such 
a rude manner than by the Government of Zimbabwe. I will not go back…[but will] 
recommend to [the UNHRC] to take necessary action’.38  
 
During this period, Zimbabwe was governed by an uneasy power-sharing coalition 
made-up of Tsvangirai’s MDC and president Robert Mugabe’s long-serving ZANU-
PF - an arrangement which had largely been forced upon the latter by the international 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Nominations.aspx last accessed 1 November 2015 and 
at ACHPR, ‘About ACHPR’ (2015) <http://www.achpr.org/about/ last accessed 1 November 2015. 
34
 Interviews with OHCHR Mechanisms and Special Procedures staff, UNHRC, Geneva 12 May 2015; 
interviews with UNHRC state representatives, Geneva, 13 May 2015. Interview with a UN SR, 
Oxford, 15 July 2015. 
35
 Ibid; Julia Harrington, ‘Special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights’ [2001] African Human Rights Law Journal 1 (2), 247-267; Frans Viljoen, ‘The Special 
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements and Possibilities’ [2005] 
Human Rights Quarterly 27 (1), 125-171. 
36 UNHRC Report E/CN.4/2005/64, Report of Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, < http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/125721.469521523.html> last accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC. Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, Sheila B Keitharuth. (2014) < 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/eritrea/unreports/2014%20report%20on%20Erit
rea%20A_HRC_26_45_ENG.pdf> last accessed 1 November 2015. 
37
 Sudan Tribune, ‘UN special rapporteur blocked from entering Eritrea’, 15 April 2013 
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46220> last accessed 1 November 2015. 
38
 Reuters, ‘Zimbabwe expels U.N. rights investigator’, 29 October 2009, last accessed 1 November 
2015. 
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community after contested elections in 2008. Tsvangirai had sought to use Nowak’s 
visit to weaken Mugabe by having Zimbabwe’s poor human rights record (including 
Mugabe’s treatment of Tsvangirai himself) highlighted internationally, as well as to 
signal to Western donors (now considering a return to the country) that he and the 
MDC would take the country in a new, more humanitarian direction.
39
 Tsvangirai 
underestimated ZANU-PF’s continued hold on the Zimbabwean security services, 
however, with Nowak’s expulsion ultimately making Tsvangirai’s movement (now 
part of the government) look weak.
40
 In 2013, Tsvangirai lost the Zimbabwean 
presidential election to Mugabe by 34% to 62% and was dismissed as executive prime 
minister, a post which was then abolished. 
 
A range of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian African states and state actors have 
nevertheless engaged with the system in a more strategic fashion to secure agency at 
the international level. Both Chad and Sudan, for example, have variously ignored 
visit requests from the UN SR for human rights defenders and freedom of expression 
(Chad seven times between 2002-2011) but engaged more constructively with those 
on IDPs; Sudan welcomed the SR for this mandate for visits in 2004 and 2005 and 
Chad in 2009.
41
 In the case of Sudan, this partly reflects – in all likelihood – 
                                                        
39
 Martin Howell, ‘Zimbabwe’s PM asks investors, donors to return’, Reuters 28 January 2010, 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/28/idUKN28247930._CH_.2420> last accessed 1 November 
2015 
40
 See, for example, analysis by the UK House of Commons International Development Committee, 
DFID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe: Eight Report of Session 2009-2010 Volume II (House of Commons 
2010) Ev 67-68. 
41
 UNHRC Report, E/CN.4/2005/101, Report of Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on human rights defenders - Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies 
received < http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/2005/101/Add.1&Lang=E> 
last accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC Report, E/CN.4/2006/95, Annual Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders (Ms Hina Jilani) < 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/103/68/PDF/G0610368.pdf?OpenElement> last 
accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/10/12, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/107/78/PDF/G0910778.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015;  UNHRC, Report A/HRC/13/22, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/docs/A.HRC.13.22.pdf> last accessed 1 November 
2015 ; UNHRC Report A/HRC/16/44, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/16session/A-HRC-16-44.pdf> last accessed 1 
November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/19/55, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-
1955_en.pdf> last accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/22/47, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.47_en.
pdf> last accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC, Report E/CN.4/2005/64, Report of Ambeyi Ligabo, 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
< http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5637425.18424988.html> last accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC, 
Report A/HRC/4/27, Report of Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression < http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/101/81/PDF/G0710181.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015; UNHRC, Report E/CN.4/2005/8, Report of the UN Secretary-General on internally-
displaced persons, Francis M Deng < http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/161/03/PDF/G0416103.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015; UNHRC, Report E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6, Report of the Representative of the 
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Khartoum’s desire to deflect international censure for its part in the Darfur conflict – 
a leading source of international criticism.
42
 In September 2004, for example, US 
secretary of state Colin Powell labelled the violence a ‘genocide’ and the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1564 threatening Sudanese officials with sanctions if violence 
continued in its western region
43
; notably Sudan ignored a 2005 invitation from the 
African SR for Refugees to visit Darfur. This mixing of constructive engagement and 
request denial also represents a quid pro quo offered by both states to the international 
community – access and engagement on one area of concern (Darfur and IDPs) but 
stonewalling on another (human rights/freedom of expression).  
 
More broadly, though, this latter behaviour forms part of a wider strategy both states 
have engaged in since the early 2000s vis-à-vis the international community. With 
some of the most complex and protracted IDP and refugee crises within and across 
their borders on the African continent, both states have consistently engaged the 
international system as a means to ‘socialise’ the issue. That is, they have 
intermittently welcomed or facilitated (albeit under strict oversight) UN, EU and other 
forms of international actors to assist in providing humanitarian and security 
assistance to refugees and IDPs as a means to internationalise responsibility for the 
problem – and to free-up space elsewhere in the domestic budget for regime 
maintenance-focused purposes.
44
 Simultaneously, Chad in particular has 
instrumentalised international support under this socialisation strategy to augment and 
enhance the size and resources of its own security forces.
45
  
 
DRC has also sought to ‘socialise’ its own security problems in a similar fashion. 
Regional and international intervention against rebel movements in its eastern regions 
have been cautiously facilitated by Kinshasa as an attempt to transfer responsibility 
for policing insecurity and human rights abuses here away from the government. This 
includes the issue of rape as a weapon of war – high on the international agenda in 
DRC since the mid-2000s and a problem which has led a senior UN official to label 
the country the ‘rape capital of the world’.46 Significantly, Kinshasa has also engaged 
with the SR system as a means to socialise this issue, inviting the UN SR on Violence 
                                                                                                                                                              
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally-displaced persons, Walter Kalin <http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/107/55/PDF/G0610755.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/13/21/Add.5 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/177/69/PDF/G0917769.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015. 
42
 Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ [2005] 
Security Dialogue 36 (1) 27-47. 
43
 BBC News Website, ‘Powell declares genocide in Sudan’, 9 September 2004. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3641820.stm> last accessed 1 November 2015; BBC News Website, ‘Full 
Text: UN Sudan Resolution’, 19 September 2004 <t 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3669978.stm> last accessed 1 November 2015. 
44
 Jonathan Fisher and David M Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in 
Africa’ [2015] International Affairs 91 (1) 131-151. 
45
 Ibid, 137, 143-145. 
46
 BBC News Website, ‘UN official calls DR Congo ‘rape capital of the world’, 28 April 2010 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8650112.stm> last accessed 1 November 2015; Nicole D’Errico, 
Tshibangu Kalaba, Louise Bashige Nzigire, Felicien Maisha and Luc Malemo Kaliysa, “You say rape, 
I say hospitals. But whose voice is louder?” Health, aid and decision-making in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’ [2013] Review of African Political Economy, 40 (135) 51-66. 
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against Women to DRC in 2007 having ignored countless requests previously.
47
 This 
coincided with the launch of  International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into 
rebel war crimes and crimes against humanity following a 2004 referral by the 
Congolese president - a further example of the international socialisation of a 
domestic problem (in this case, anti-government rebels). 
 
A range of African states have also sought to use the UN SR system as a means to 
secure greater influence on the international stage. Throughout the 2000s, for 
example, Chad, and Rwanda demonstrated limited interest in engaging with the SR 
system. From 2011 (Rwanda) and 2012 (Chad), however, both issued standing 
invitations to all UN thematic mandate-holders to demonstrate their constructive 
engagement with the UN system as part of a broader international campaign to secure 
election to the African UNSC seats.
48
 Though standing invitations from African states 
do not automatically translate into accepted visits – Sierra Leone did not respond to a 
range of requests from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention during the 
2000s in spite of formally issuing standing invitations.
49
 This behaviour by Kigali and 
Ndjamena appears to have assisted with the two states’ campaigns. Rwanda joined the 
UNSC in 2012 and Chad in 2014. 
 
Finally, it is useful to also consider how African states have engaged with different 
parts of the UN SP and AU SR systems to secure agency in the international system. 
In spring 2015, for example, Sudan accepted simultaneous visits from the UN country 
SR and the UN SR on Violence against Women along with the AU SR on human 
rights in spring 2015. This followed several years of stonewalling and to coincide 
with one SR’s final few months in office. This was met with scepticism by UNHRC 
officials in Geneva, who feared that Khartoum would seek to play each off against 
one another while in the country to minimise criticism, while accepting international 
‘credit’ for opening its doors to monitors in the midst of a complex standoff with the 
UN over the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from Darfur.
50
  
 
Likewise, where some states have been reluctant to engage with the UN SR system 
they have nevertheless been far more open to engaging the AU system. Ethiopia, for 
example, ignored a range of requests for visits from the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention during the 2000s but issued a standing invitation simultaneously 
during this period to the AU SR on Prisons and Detention, accepting a visit in 2004. 
This reflects, for some in Geneva, a perception in some African capitals that AU SR 
are more malleable and less likely to be critical than their UN counterparts given their 
limited resources and heavy dependence upon African governments and political 
                                                        
47
 UNHRC, Report A/HRC/7/6/Add.4, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, 
its causes and consequences, Yakin Erturk < http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/298496.074974537.html> 
last accessed 1 November 2015. 
48
 Interviews with AU Peace and Security officials, Addis Ababa, May 201 
49
 UNHRC, Report E/CN.4/2006/7, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention < 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/166/48/PDF/G0516648.pdf?OpenElement> last 
accessed 1 November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/7/4, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention  <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/100/91/PDF/G0810091.pdf?OpenElement> last accessed 1 
November 2015; UNHRC, Report A/HRC/16/47, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
< http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/102/76/PDF/G1110276.pdf?OpenElement> last 
accessed 1 November 2015.  
50
 Interview with senior OHCHR Special Procedures official, UNHRC, Geneva 12 May 2015. 
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structures themselves to maintain legitimacy in their roles.
51
 In the case of Ethiopia – 
together with many other African states – there is also, however, a crucial normative 
element to decisions regarding engaging with the UN or AU around ‘African issues’, 
a point which will be developed below. 
 
It is clear, then, that a number of African states have calibrated their engagements 
with the UN and AU systems skilfully to maximise the space available for securing 
agency at a range of levels. This has included defensive strategies, aimed at 
neutralising or re-directing international criticism or censure (often at key moments of 
difficulty for that state in its broader relationship with the global system) as well as 
those focused on instrumentalising the systems more generally for domestic, regional 
or international political purposes. For those with particularly complex relationships 
with the UN and Western actors, however, more assertive strategies are apparent – 
notably in the use of SR systems to move areas of domestic crisis and responsibility 
into the international sphere; depoliticising and socialising problems which are often 
the consequence (direct or indirect) of government neglect or worse. 
 
2. Contested perspectives and the SP system in Africa 
 
At this point, it is vital to acknowledge the diverse range and character of African 
states and their many different relationships with the international system. The 
discussion above has largely placed African states into a singular category vis-à-vis 
their engagement/non-engagement with SR systems, one which has tended to 
characterise them as cynical and insincere in their approach to international and 
regional human rights structures. As will have become apparent, however, the 
strategies above have tended to be employed by particular types of African states – 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian polities whose governments have long 
demonstrated disinterest in protecting citizens from arbitrary and violent attacks on 
their security and livelihoods. Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, DRC and Zimbabwe are among 
the continent’s longest and worst offenders in this regard while Ethiopia and Rwanda 
– whose developmental vision has been praised in many quarters – continue to feature 
heavily among states criticised for not upholding human rights norms.
52
 
 
Within the UNHRC itself, as in many other fora, African states do not all share the 
same approach or agendas. Officials in Geneva note how the Arab Spring ‘split’ an 
African group previously dominated by Egypt and South Africa and that a 
‘fragmentation’ of the group has since occurred, with different states rallying around 
different causes and concerns, to a degree at least.
53
 UNHRC staff identify a number 
of states which they view as genuinely committed to working with the SR structures 
to help improve the situations of their own citizens and to engage critically and 
effectively within the system to promote cross-cutting issues of concern (such as 
forced marriage or threats posed by groups such as Boko Haram). Perhaps 
                                                        
51
 Ibid. 
52
 While macro-indices rarely capture the nuances of governance and human rights trajectories in 
individual states it is nonetheless worth noting that Freedom House’s 2015 ‘Freedom in the World’ 
analysis categorises all seven of these states as ‘not free’, with Sudan and Eritrea both being awarded 
the lowest possible scores across the board (civil liberties, political rights and freedom rating) (see 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VW3FH-eXGpg, last accessed 1 
June 2015). Furthermore, three of the four reports produced by Human Rights Watch since the start of 
2015 have (at the time of writing) focused on one of these seven states. 
53
 Interview with OHCHR senior Mechanisms official, UNHRC, Geneva 12 May 2015. 
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revealingly, most of these states are among the continent’s most democratic – 
Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia – and many appear to have issued 
standing invitations (eg Benin, Ghana and Zambia) and accepted visits across 
mandates and time periods without clear ‘ulterior motives’ (such as those outlined in 
section 1.2).
54
 
 
It remains somewhat problematic – and incongruent with the sentiments of many 
African officials
55
 - to view commitment to, or subversion of, the UN SP system by 
African governments as equal to support for, or rejection of, human rights. Many 
African political leaders cynically appeal to narratives on ‘neo-colonial tools of 
oppression’ and ‘African solutions to African problems’ in order to bat away 
international criticisms of their human rights or governance records or in an attempt to 
delegitimise planned humanitarian interventions or legal processes.
56
 For instance, the 
UN’s recognition of Alassane Outtarra’s election victory in Cote d’Ivoire in 
December 2010 was painted in this light by incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo 
(who refused to leave office, eventually being deposed by French troops) as have 
been the activities of the ICC by presidential indictees Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and 
Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya
57
 and their allies since 2010 and 2012 respectively.
58
  
 
The adoption of such stances – however insincere – often resonate within African 
societies because they draw-upon deep, longstanding and sincere feelings of 
ambivalence in parts of the continent regarding the intentions and goodwill of the 
(seemingly Western-dominated) international community. At one level this derives 
from historic experiences of oppression and violence experienced during the colonial 
era and experiences of instrumentalisation and manipulation by major powers during 
the Cold War.
59
 In specific cases, particular experiences of apparent neglect or 
betrayal by the international organisations especially have also heavily coloured the 
                                                        
54
 In Freedom House’s 2015 ‘Freedom in the World’ analysis, Benin, Bostwana, Ghana, Namibia and 
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57
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presidential election while still an indictee. The ICC dropped the charges against him in December 
2014, 18 months into his presidency. 
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 Time, ‘Ivory Coast’s Disputed Presidential Election’, 6 December 2010 
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035342,00.html> last accessed 1 November 2015. 
59
 See Kurt Mills, “Bashir is dividing us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court’ [2012] Human 
Rights Quarterly 34 (2) 404-447 for an interesting discussion on past and contemporary discussions 
between African states in this regard. 
 15 
perspectives of political elites towards the institution: notably in Rwanda post-1994 
and in Eritrea since the mid-2000s.
60
 
 
More generally, however, these ‘anticolonial’ sentiments when applied by African 
states to issues of international justice arise from a much more fundamental debate 
within and across African societies and polities regarding the universality and 
applicability of a range of ‘international’ norms and approaches in the African 
context.
61
 The absence of notions of community rights and responsibilities from 
international human rights and charters, for examples, is a perennial critique made by 
AU and ACHPR officials, as well as a range of African states, elites, analysts, CSOs 
and communities themselves.
62
 The focus of much international human rights law on 
shaming, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators is also argued to fly in the face of 
‘traditional’ African legal mechanisms which focus on reconciliation and ‘moving 
on’.63 A common critique by regional officials and NGO actors of the ICC process in 
Kenya during 2013-2014, for example, centred around the value of further inflaming 
tensions by trying leading politicians in the Hague (including the serving president 
and deputy president) as opposed to promoting more reconciliatory activities.
64
 
Furthermore, a range of African NGOs and public officials also maintain a narrative 
which argues that the ‘African’ approach to pushing leaders for change focuses upon 
constructive and respectful dialogue, often behind closed doors, rather than on public 
demonisation or criticism.
65
 
 
The extent to which any of these tropes reflect attitudes widely-held (currently or 
previously) within African societies or speak to genuinely historic practices or norms 
(if, indeed, the ‘survival’ of such practices can be truly conceived of following 
centuries of dynamic interactions within and between African societies and other 
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peoples) is a longstanding and rich debate among scholars of anthropology, 
transitional justice and hybridity – and is not the focus of this piece.66 It is important, 
however, to highlight in this study of agency the degree to which Africa’s approach to 
the SP and wider international human rights architectures reflect attempts to reframe 
debates within the UN around agendas and perspectives presented – notionally or 
otherwise – as ‘African’. 
 
The fact that African SR are appointed by the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights (emphasis our own) is arguably a conscious attempt by the AU to 
challenge the perceived individual-centric nature of international human rights law as 
well as an effort to promote a different understanding of human rights.
67
 The 
development of mandates with less adversarial or more anodyne themes to their UN 
counterparts – ‘prisons’ instead of ‘arbitrary detention’, ‘rights of women’ instead of 
‘discrimination – or violence – against women’, ‘refugees’ instead of ‘internally 
displaced’ – also reflects, arguably, the ACHPR’s promotion of a more subordinate, 
cooperative or even ‘respectful’ approach to dealing with African states. This builds 
on the notion that positive change can only take place with the constructive support of 
states – requiring a gentle and deferential form of engagement by actors such as SRs. 
For, to engage on ‘arbitrary detention’ already suggests a level of critique of a state 
structure which activity on ‘prisons’ does not. Moreover, states are invariably 
responsible for the creation (directly or otherwise) and protection of IDPs whereas 
refugees are created by poor governance or insecurity abroad. 
 
The manner in which AU SR are appointed and conduct their work is also much more 
in line with this approach. While member states play a leading role in the appointment 
of both UN and AU SRs, their influence in the former case is limited by procedure in 
a way which is not the case in the latter. While states screen candidates in the UN 
system, for example, any individual can apply to be considered. Moreover, a shortlist 
is delineated by a group of ambassadors who then provide this to the President of the 
UNHCR for the final selection.
68
  
 
Furthermore, with few exceptions, AU SR visits take the form of either informal add-
ons to conference or workshop trips, ‘fact-finding missions’ or ‘promotional visits’, 
the latter being focused mainly on promoting the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights, ‘exchanging views and sharing experiences with major human rights 
stakeholders’, to raise awareness of the Africa Commission within the government 
bureaucracy and to encourage closer collaboration between the Commission, state and 
CSOs (see, for example, the report on a promotional visit to Zambia in 2008, ACHPR 
2008).
69
 Recommendations are made on the back of such trips although the form of 
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engagement is framed in far more cooperative terms than that of UN SRs. Reports of 
these visits, when written, are also rarely made fully or publicly available in the same 
manner as those by UN SRs, further evidence – arguably – of a more deferential-style 
relationship between the ACHPR, its SR and African states than that between 
counterparts in the UN system.
70
 It is worth noting, though, that state-AU SR relations 
are not always harmonious. In 2005, the AU SR for Refugees was asked to leave 
Zimbabwe by the government following unsuccessful negotiations to extend a fact-
finding mission of one week. 
 
For many officials in Geneva – both within the UNHCR and in member state 
missions, as well as some AU SR themselves, this state of affairs reflects less a divide 
in normative perspectives but more the consequence of limited resources.
71
 As noted, 
unlike their UN counterparts, AU SRs’ capacity is heavily restricted by an almost 
total lack of financial and administrative resources – including no travel or office 
budgets – and most are therefore almost entirely dependent upon governments of 
visiting states to facilitate and manage their visits. Some AU SR seek to overcome 
this ‘sense of isolation’ from the wider global human rights network through 
undertaking joint visits with UN or other AU SR – such as the 2008 joint visit by UN 
and AU SR for Human Rights Defenders to Togo or the 2013 joint visit by AU SR for 
Human Rights Defenders and by AU SR for Prisons and Refugees to Chad – although 
coordination between AU SR and between AU and UN SR remains limited overall.
72
  
 
This structural lack of independence among AU SR is further compounded by the fact 
that many rely upon African governments and state bureaucracies for their livelihoods 
themselves. Whereas most UN SR are drawn from independent academic and policy 
institutions, most AU SR are more often drawn from ministries or state-funded 
agencies, NGOs or policy advice bodies.
73
 They are, therefore – in the words of one 
senior UNHCR official – often part of the ‘same culture as the governments’ whose 
record on human rights they are assessing.
74
 This does not, of course, mean that AU 
SR will automatically hold-back from highlighting or criticising abuses but it does, at 
the very least, represent a significant structural disincentive for doing so which is less 
present in the context of UN SR work. 
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It would be problematic, however, to view differences in the AU approach to SP as 
purely a reflection of practicalities – not least given the much greater success rate AU 
SR have had in the last decade in gaining consistent access to more authoritarian 
polities than UN SRs, albeit as part of promotional visits (notably Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Chad and Rwanda). Instead, it is helpful to place the issues discussed above in the 
wider context of African state engagement with the UN.  
 
In their analysis of the development of SP mandates, for example, Freedman and 
Mchangama highlight the prominent role of African authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian states (along with others from the developing and non-Western world) in 
supporting the creation of ‘Third Generation Rights’ mandates – focused on issues of 
global ‘solidarity’ and equity – over those centred around political and civil rights, as 
promoted particularly by Western liberal democratic states.
75
 The ACHPR also 
contains a ‘right to development’ unparalleled in other comparable charters 
worldwide.
76
 
 
African states were also major players in the 2009 Durban Review Conference and 
2011 ‘Durban III’ meeting, both of which were largely boycotted by Western states 
and focused upon an agenda of opposing racism, racial discrimination and 
xenophobia. The boycotts came in response to a variety of objections by Western 
states to perceived anti-Israel, anti-semitic and anti-blasphemy language in the pre-
conference negotiations and the 2001 Durban Declaration and Plan of Action (a 
review of which was the basis for the 2009 conference) - as well as disagreement over 
how to address the issue of slavery, including the question of the US and European 
states issuing apologies for past crimes in this area.
77
 
 
For many African states, however, the issue of racism has been neglected in 
discussions and mandates created by the UNHRC. This reflects – according to them – 
an inherent Western bias within the UN system. Within this narrative, Western states 
and allies can seemingly dictate norms and use these to censure opponents and block 
criticism based on other normative agendas. The absence of a permanent African, or 
‘Southern’, seat on the UNSC, the perceived US ‘protection’ of Israel within the UN 
system, the prominence of African states among UN SR country mandates (4/10) and 
the fact that all 36 people indicted by the ICC to date
78
 are from an African state all 
feed into this narrative and reinforce its power and legitimacy for many African 
politicians and others on and outside the continent.
79
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The differing mandates of AU SRs, more deferential AU SR approach to engaging 
states and promotion of modified or separate agendas within the UNHRC and wider 
UN system by African states should also, then, be understood as part of a wider quest 
for normative agency. This quest is not simply concerned with avoiding or re-
directing critique but in challenging the notion of a universal consensus on the 
contents of human rights and the attempted negotiation of an alternative or, at least, 
wider conceptualisation. Whether this is a positive or negative development for 
African citizens themselves is a different question; either way, though, it forces those 
who care about the continent to take more seriously how and why African states 
engage with SR systems.  
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to critically unpack and explore the engagement 
of African states with the UN and AU SR systems, focusing particularly on the ways 
in which different states carve out agency within this dynamic. In doing so, the study 
builds-upon a growing literature on African agency in the international system to 
challenge notions of African weakness and dependency which have previously 
characterised much International Relations academic discourse.  
 
Highlighting how semi-authoritarian and authoritarian African states in particular 
have engaged with SR to evade international criticism as well as to secure greater 
influence and political space at the global level, the chapter has also emphasised the 
normative dimension to these interactions. For while a range of (particularly more 
democratic) African states seek to engage with the UNHRC and SR systems 
‘constructively’ – that is in pursuit of their defined objectives – many take a deeply 
ambivalent view of how ‘human rights’ are conceptualised within the Council and the 
mandates it appoints. Hence, the development of the AU SR system and wider 
engagement of African states with the UN human rights architecture should be 
understood not simply as reactionary or pragmatic but part of a broader contestation 
of global human rights norms and governance mechanisms. 
 
In this context, the making of recommendations has not been a clear objective of this 
analysis. A preliminary consideration of the implications of this study for UNHCR, 
AU and SP officials, however, leads to a number of conclusions. More comprehensive 
engagement between UN and AU SR – and the two systems in general – clearly holds 
significant advantages for both sides, and for the promotion of human rights as 
understood by both the UNHCR and the ACHPR.  
 
A more systematic exchange between SR would allow for a clearer division of labour 
vis-à-vis planned visits, target states and crises and undermine state attempts to play 
SR and systems off against one another. This would also open-up greater space for the 
sharing of resources and expertise between the two sides; at present AU SR must rely 
on ad hoc assistance from NGOs such as The International Foundation for the 
Protection of Human Rights Defenders together with a range of other actors in 
academic and elsewhere. AU SR also argue that their authority is enhanced through 
association/joint visits with UN SR whose perceived independence and expertise they 
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also value.
80
 Though greater coordination and resource exchange would, of course, 
require greater capacity-building on both sides this would not only enhance the 
effectiveness of both systems, it would also provide structural support to African 
states with a genuine commitment to doing this. At present, as many officials in 
Geneva note, strong African voices within the AU SP system and UNHRC itself rise 
and fall with the particular skills and expertise of individual diplomats and 
personnel.
81
 
 
It is important, however, for UN officials to see any greater cooperation or exchange 
as a mutually-beneficial arrangement. At present, some of the former feel that UN SR 
are primarily ‘opening the doors for regional SR’ through their interactions with 
them.
82
 As argued above, however, AU SR tend to be more conscious of how best to 
secure access to parts of the continent and of what approaches are most effective in 
constructively engaging state actors, even in authoritarian settings. More 
fundamentally, though, AU SR are more clearly able to credibly represent and parse 
African (state and popular) perspectives on human rights norms at the UN and global 
level. Where these perspectives challenge those held by officials based in, and 
appointed by, Geneva this provides an opportunity for open and critical exchange, 
rather than dismissal by the former as cynical African politicking. Since, for better or 
worse, the actual prevention of human rights abuses remains heavily within the 
purview of states themselves – international mechanisms to ensure that such 
prevention occurs must therefore remain legitimate in the eyes of states themselves. 
 
The fate of the ICC represents a cautionary tale for supporters of the SP system in this 
regard. The Court was established with massive African support (with more than half 
of the continent’s polities ratifying, or acceding to, the Rome Statute by late 2003) 
and a number of governments – including those of South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania 
– even viewed the institution as a welcome challenge to US hegemony and 
‘imperialism’. Within a decade, however, the ICC became thoroughly delegitimised 
within the continent’s political elites. The indictments of a number of senior African 
leaders (including the serving Sudanese president and Kenyan deputy prime minister 
along with the recently deposed leaders of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire), apparently 
arbitrary and top-down selection of indictees, perceived disregard for African state 
legal processes and heavy focus on African cases has eroded the institution’s 
legitimacy for many African states, including some of its earliest supporters.
83
   
 
In late 2014, for example, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni – who had sat 
alongside ICC Special Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo when the latter announced 
the indictment of several Ugandan rebel leaders in 2005 – called upon African states 
(in Swahili) to pull-out of the Court and ‘let them [Western states] stay with their 
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court’. 84  This sentiment was echoed by Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn days later when he condemned the ICC as a tool of Western imperialism: 
‘[UNSC permanent members] have stayed away from the court, but still use it to 
implement their political will’ – having previously accused it of ‘intimidating and 
harassing’ African states.85 
 
Whether such a volte-face among many of the continent’s leaders was inevitable 
when the ICC turned on their number (as opposed to their rebel opponents) in its 
indictments is open to question. Regardless, though, the Court is increasingly losing 
credibility as a vehicle for effectively prosecuting and deterring massive human rights 
violations in Africa.
86
 If the UN and AU SP systems are to avoid the same fate, more 
comprehensive and mutually empathetic exchange is vital. 
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